This book begins and ends with a defense of an interesting and provocative thesis. Right actions, choices, intentions, and the virtues which dispose one to right actions are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for being a good person. As Keenan defines it "goodness is the measure of persons, their habits of conduct, and their acts as proceeding from one who strives openly out of love to realize right living" ; and "rightness is the measure of acts and the proximate sources (...) of acts, that is, choices, intentions, and virtues, according to their fittingness to reason". Since an agent's failure to conform to rational standards of conduct does not mean that the agent is not striving to do so, rightness is not a necessary condition for goodness. Since an agent's actually conforming to rational standards does not mean that the agent is striving out of love to become more rightly ordered, rightness is not a sufficient condition for goodness. (shrink)